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Abstract: With this abstract I intend to reflect on the implications between 
individuals and society, starting from the question “Does life in society has to 
be beautiful or good?” For this, I support my paper on the work of Franz 
Kafka, In The Penal Colony, to represent a social theater of cruelty aesthetics 
in contemporary societies of post-modernity. 
The social dimension of ethics is a sort of practice of cruelty as well as a 
sort of aesthetics representing prescriptions of society, which clashes with the 
contemporary trends of these post-modern societies characterized by the 
individualism, narcissism, consumption and media spectacle. 
The theater of cruelty works on punishing the condemned; it is 
essentially a work of social aesthetics or hygienist ethics. The insensitive 
machine of Law has social authority and it embodies the faults or the mistakes 
punished in Kafka’s writing. Is this machine still working (in an invisible way) 
in our societies, where the social requirements remain the order of the Law? 
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1. Introduction 
In his otebook 1914-16, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote: “Ethics does not 
treat of the world; Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic” 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1979: 77). If Ethics is such condition of the world, we 
should live an ethical life. The problem is that we live (ethically or not) in 
individualistic and senseless post-modern societies, i.e., Occidental societies 
stigmatized, according to Peter Singer (2006: 53), by crises of social values and 
by the loss of sense of community. Nevertheless, there are authors, like Singer, 
who answer clearly “yes” to the question “Can we live an ethical life?” Singer 
explains what is to live ethically: “it is to reflect in a particular way about how 
we live and to try act accordingly with the conclusions of that reflection” 
(2006: 16). But, the question “How we should live?” is ancestral, everlasting; it 
was already discussed in Ancient Philosophy, namely in Plato’s Republic, 
therefore, it is not a contemporary concern of our post-modern epoch. 
Returning to the above-quoted passage from Wittgenstein’s notebook, it 
means that Ethics has an undoubted purpose, a sort of condition sine qua non 
to live or to be in the world. I share Wittgenstein’s thesis, and also consider 
Ethics and Aesthetics as one, according to Wittgenstein’s remark in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1999: 6.421). Ethics and Aesthetics are one 
because there is something beautiful (at least in an aesthetical existence 
perspective) doing good things to other people. For Wittgenstein, “when a 
general ethical law of the form ‘Thou shalt...’ is set up, the first thought is: 
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Suppose I do not do it?” (1979: 78). “It is clear”, he points out, “that ethics has 
nothing to do with punishment and reward”; so he argues that the question 
about the consequences of an action must be unimportant, because 
consequences are not actions or events. But, we should be responsible 
following or not the social rules. Can there be any ethics if there is no living 
being but myself in the world? To whom my life (i.e. my behavior, actions or 
attitudes) could be beautiful or good?  
I introduce the literary work of Franz Kafka into these contemporary 
sociological problems because he wrote metaphorically about human 
condition. A sort of miserable and painful condition of all aware men face a 
inflexible destiny of death, loneness, pain, suffering, misery, fear, angst and 
agony. These are the main worries or philosophical subjects of Kafka’s 
writings. In toto, there is an existentialist perspective of Kafka’s writings. This 
is the thesis of my paper, which is also corroborated by Alexandre Vialatte, 
Kafka’s first French translator, who labeled these worries or philosophical 
subjects as a “diabolic innocence” (VIALATTE, 1998). 
One of the great qualities of Kafka’s writings is the ability to explore 
these sensations, which are unconscious to the majority of people. These 
sensations are adverse, negative, and, therefore, they are also undesirable. But 
they belong to human nature; they characterize the anonymous and timeless 
human condition. Kafka’s stories transform these sensations in common places. 
To understand Kafka is to understand his writings, because he starts 
from inside of himself. His biography is his bibliography, a fragmented 
bibliography composed by feelings, which In the Penal Colony is only one 
small part of the whole puzzle of tragic human condition. The cruelty, the 
prepotency and mortification or the absence of justice’s principles suffered by 
a condemned during his execution is similar to our real life. 
In the Penal Colony is a small fantastic story, one of the few works 
published by Kafka in his lifetime. This story allows us to feel Kafka’s interest 
on those existentialists’ subjects, challenging our understanding of everyday 
problems like a fair trial or a reasonable and mechanical power over our human 
behavior or human moral alienation. 
 
 
2. The problem of cruelty aesthetics 
The problem of cruelty aesthetics could be formulated through the 
following question: Why should we live ethically (taking an aesthetical 
existence) if we live in post-modern societies, where everything around us is 
spectacle and represents a sort of social theater of cruelty, selfish and apparent 
Aesthetics? 
 
 
3. Conceptual framing 
The conceptual framing of the previous problem presupposes a 
confrontation between 1) the ethical naturalism and 2) the ethical 
conventionalism and the moral relativism. Ad primum, a perspective already 
pursued by Plato and Aristotle, it is argued that there are good values or moral 
actions per se, i.e., we can live ethically by ourselves due to the (good or bad) 
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human nature or essence. Ad secundum, a perspective radically opposed to the 
former, it justifies the diversity or the subjectivity of ways of life. 
The moral relativism as a cultural relativity could be justified through 
these ways of life or a given “form of life”, according to Wittgenstein’s 
terminology. “Form of life” implies another important concept to Wittgenstein, 
the one of “language-game”, i.e. the idea that to speak a language is part of an 
activity guided by rules, in a form of life. “To imagine a language means to 
imagine a form of life” (WITTGENSTEIN, 1996: §§ 19, 23). If a form of life 
is a language-game, then countless language-games exist, countless forms of 
life also exist. 
The ethical conventionalism and the moral relativism justify ethical 
differences between human beings and deny the existence of a unique moral 
code with universal and timeless value to human condition. 
 
 
4. The prescription: ethical conventionalism and moral relativism 
In the Penal Colony represents a trilogy: language, technique and 
power, three vertices of those societies and cultures settled in principles of 
Order and Progress. This story is like a stage where the cruelty aesthetics of 
life is represented. Speaking of “cruelty aesthetics” seems contradictory, 
because Aesthetics, by rule, does not represent, promote or suggest any 
unpleasant and painful feeling, or, at least, it should not. On the contrary, 
Aesthetics is an exercise of beauty production. So, it should be pleasant to our 
senses; it should stimulate positive sensations and feelings. 
However, the cruelty aesthetics of In the Penal Colony comes from 
something that is external to the Aesthetics itself, i.e., from an ethical 
dimension, which is the legitimacy of cruelty (even in an aesthetical 
dimension). For this reason, I sustain a theoretical path to the prescription of 
the cruelty aesthetics and ethics over Kafka’s In the Penal Colony. I mean the 
prescription of the Law on the body. The penalty execution machine writes the 
sentence on the body of the condemned till a bloodless death body. The 
machine executes the Law with authority, i.e. a given law as an outcome of an 
ethical conventionalism and moral relativism. The machine embodies the 
mistake or crime of the condemned on his own body. This is a kind of supreme 
and ironic manifestation of the relation crime-punishment. A relation well 
explored in the Crime and Punishment, the Dostoevsky’s magnum opus. 
The prescription is the order of the Law. The condemned pays his crime 
with the appropriated punishment: the prescription of the Law, forgotten or 
neglected by the condemned, is written on his body through his spilled blood 
until the last drop. Ironically, the prescription recorded forever on the body of 
the condemned would be pedagogically useless in future actions. 
The machine allows the inscription taking form on the body of the 
condemned. According to the officer’s description, the machine has two kinds 
of needles arranged in multiple patterns. Each long needle has a short one 
beside it. “The long needle does the writing, and the short needle sprays a jet of 
water to wash away the blood and keep the inscription clear” (KAFKA, 2005: 
147). During this process, the ethical prescription is written on the body. The 
calligraphy is hard to read and it needs to be studied closely. The point of the 
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officer is that the script can’t be a simple one, because it is not supposed to kill 
a man straight off, but only after an interval of, on average, twelve hours 
(KAFKA, 2005: 149). The machine keeps on writing deeper and deeper for the 
whole twelve hours. 
If it is difficult, for someone, to decipher the script with the eyes, it 
would not be difficult for the condemned, as he will decipher it with his pains 
and wounds. At the end of this complex task, when the harrow has pierced the 
prisoner quite through and casts him into the pit, the “judgment has been 
fulfilled” and the condemned can be buried (KAFKA, 2005: 150). 
As we can read in Kafka’s story, it was undeniable the injustice of the 
procedure and the inhumanity of the execution (KAFKA, 2005: 151). The 
explorer that had been invited to attend the execution (he could be anyone not 
familiar with this ritual) seemed to express a view against this kind of Justice. 
But the condemned would die with the prescription (that he forgot) on his 
body. 
 
 
5. The aesthetics of the rule and punishing 
What does it mean to follow a social rule? What may happen if one does 
not follow a given rule? There would be consequences for whom? In Kafka’s 
story, the Law is shown aesthetically in the draft of the machine all over the 
body of the condemned. The performance of the machine is aesthetical, 
considering three aspects: 
1) The prescription of the Law transcribed into alphabetic signs (i.e. into 
text) or into ideographic signs (i.e. into draws and images). 
2) The passage of the verbal formulation of Law into a physical imprint, 
i.e. into a peculiar support: the proper body of the condemned, the one 
who made a rule deviation action considering the established Law. 
3) A sort of idyllic death: a final pedagogical dimension that takes the 
condemned to die with the Law written on his body. 
 
Ad primum, taking into account the Zen Buddhism, the creation of signs 
with the brush full of ink requires asceticism from the painter or writer, i.e. a 
sort of inner emptying. It is like the fulfillment of an aesthetical state of empty. 
This empty should be understood positively as an opportunity to fulfill 
something with something else. So, we shouldn’t understand the empty as a 
simple absence or blank. 
Ad secundum, the mentioned passage also presupposes the 
transformation of the criminal body (full of vice, faults and deviances) to an 
aesthetical body, with lines, letters, words, draws. Let us take into account one 
of the most striking episodes of the height of rationality in ancient Greece: the 
death of Socrates. This episode is described by Plato in his dialogue named 
Crito (PLATO, 2002). Crito, the interlocutor and friend of Socrates, 
recommends the escape, but Socrates admits that it is irrational according to 
the laws of Athens and accepts the consequences. Aware of his situation, 
Socrates waits for death as a human condition face the Law, considering:  
a) We must always accept the laws of the State; 
b) We should respect our compromises; 
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c) We shouldn’t prejudice the Polis.  
 
From these three principles, Socrates takes the conclusion that he must 
accept death instead of run away. But, what is the sense of Socrates’ behavior? 
It is the sense of ethical principles that must remain over any eventual personal 
benefit of his escape. 
Ad tertium, an idyllic death demands an useless learning to the 
condemned’s life, because he dies with the lesson. An idyllic death reminds us 
the importance of the arête, i.e. it’s role, it’s pedagogical ideal and cultural 
practice for the individual education. At this point, the classical culture and it’s 
historical and referential legacy would allows an useful parallel with our 
contemporary western societies, taking into account the death of Socrates, 
representing a pedagogical ideal of the aretê. 
In Kafka’s writing, there is no option to the askésis, but there is some 
option to the aretê in death. In his turn, Latin tradition preserves the proverbial 
words of Ovid (1989: III, 136), who said nemo ante mortem beatus (“Nobody 
is happy before death”). What we have to do is to follow the sense and the 
practice of justice. How? The Rhetoric of Aristotle gives us a kind of taxonomy 
about the subject of Justice, including all the possible situations and motives to 
practice justice. “Every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: 
chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite” (1998: 1369a). 
The practice of (in) justice is one of the main issues explored by Kafka’s In the 
Penal Colony. At the beginning of this story, the officer says, with a certain air 
of admiration, “It’s a remarkable piece of apparatus” (Kafka, 2005: 140). This 
exclamation shows the prodigious machine of the Law, which “works all by 
itself”. But the accuracy of a machine goes wrong and against our expectation 
sometimes, including this particular machine (symbol of Justice). 
With such enthusiasm, the officer describes the machine as if it was an 
organic been. According to the officer, the sentence does not sound severe. But 
this seems a contradiction, because the punishment is an apparatus of cruelty. 
In his own words: “Whatever commandment the prisoner has disobeyed is 
written upon his body by the Harrow”. The prisoner was condemned to death 
for disobedience and insulting behavior to a superior and his execution is 
witnessed as an exhibition or a show. So, the prisoner will have written on his 
body: “Honor thy superiors!” (KAFKA, 2005: 144). 
The problem is that the prisoner does not know the sentence that has 
been passed on him. The officer says that “there would be no point in telling 
him [the sentence]. He’ll learn it on his body.” (KAFKA, 2005: 145). The 
prisoner doesn’t know either that he has been sentenced; he has had no chance 
of putting up a defense or just defending himself. 
The officer argues how the matter stands, saying that he have been 
appointed judge in the Penal Colony and that he knows more about the 
machine than anyone. He points out: “My guiding principle is this: Guilty is 
never to be doubted.” (KAFKA, 2005: 145). 
What does it mean to say that guilty is never to be doubted? How does 
one know that? The officer says that the explanation of the case is simple and 
based in a report of a captain an hour ago. The officer wrote down his 
statement and appended the sentence to it. “Then I had the man put in chains. 
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That was all quite simple. If I had first called the man before me and 
interrogated him, things would have got into a confused tangle.” (KAFKA, 
2005: 146). 
Nevertheless, everybody has self-awareness; therefore, they should be 
responsible for their acts and actions. Let us remember the Dostoevsky’s 
classic scene from Crime and Punishment, where Raskolnikoff thought on his 
criminal actions and compared himself to Napoleon: “I asked myself one day 
this question—what if Napoleon, for instance, had happened to be in my place, 
and (…) instead of all those picturesque and monumental things, there had 
simply been some ridiculous old hag, a pawnbroker, who had to be murdered 
too to get money from her trunk (for his career, you understand). Well, would 
he have brought himself to that if there had been no other means?” 
(DOSTOEVSKY, 2003: V, iv). 
The crime is the result of a chance. If Napoleon were in Raskolnikoff’s 
shoes, for example, before committing a murder and without other resource, 
maybe he would do the same and he would commit the crime. 
If the method (strategy that point to what to do) is the order of the 
actions in the execution of the condemned, the technique is the specific 
instrumentation; it constitutes each stage of a complex process defined by the 
method and described by the officer of the Colony. The officer does not hide 
his passion for the machine of justice. The apparatus belongs to the spectacle of 
the execution. However, there are several ethical and political problems around 
this spectacle: The nature of the technique as a source of concern and worries 
or as a source of social progress; the origin of the technique from a natural 
human necessity or from a capricious will of men over a superhuman and 
supernatural creation called “Justice”; the well-being or discomfort given by 
the technique to our post-modern societies; the deviant/normal use justifying 
potential discomfort; the apparatus of the machine described by the officer as a 
social frustration, individualism and moral alienation. 
The technique is omnipresent in our contemporary stile of life. Post-
modern societies seek civilizational progress, considering technique has a saver 
function (SPENGLER, 1993: 13). But the technique (technikon, technê) is just 
the ability to do something following certain rules and to transform a given 
natural reality into an artificial reality. The technique used in the Penal Colony 
has a final goal for life. As Martin Heidegger said: “The technê is part of the 
pro-duce, of the poiesis; it is something of poietic”; it is the possibility of 
knowledge, and knowledge gives us openings, that’s why it is also unveiling 
(HEIDEGGER, s/d: 18). This is the perspective of technique as “pro-vocation” 
(the essence of the technique as a domain of the unveiling of truth). According 
to Heidegger, the unveiling guides the modern technique and it is a pro-
vocation by which Nature is intimidated to give something. 
The machine supplies the Penal Colony’s demands of principles of 
Justice, but it also produces human necessities, i.e., improvements of the whole 
system (ORTEGA Y GASSET, 2009: 31-33). One problem raised up by 
Kafka’s story is the conscience of human condition. This conscience 
distinguishes and judges men and their life: on one side, those who have 
conscience; on the other side, those who are not aware of Justice and live the 
impulses of the instant without the sense of community. According to 
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Nietzsche, men have pride of their humanity when they compare themselves to 
others animals, but they envy the happiness of animals (NIETZSCHE, 1976: 
105). 
Nowadays, we have an extraordinary development of technology and, 
therefore, the societies are in complete and permanent transformation, because 
they are the most immediate product of the globalization phenomenon. Does 
the instrumental (new ways of communicating and interacting) and qualitative 
(new ways of knowing and living) transformations mean a better life for men? 
That is, do we live better? Do we have more knowledge? Do we personally 
relate more with others? Are we less isolated? Are we more free and 
autonomous? Have we a society more democratic, reasonable and humane? 
The post-modern societies are characterized by the triumph of the 
spectacle, by the “fast culture” and by the “fast thinking” or “ready-to-think”. 
These societies are specialists in the manufacture of consent and consensus, as 
had already warned in 1922 Walter Lippmann (2004: 134-5). So, the above-
quoted passage of Nietzsche’s critique about modernity remains useful to 
understand the tyranny of our contemporaneousness. According to Nietzsche, 
people are already starting to think with the watch in the hand while having 
lunch and the eye in the stock exchange journal (NIETZSCHE, 1998: 228-9). 
The expression “society of the spectacle” follows the Situationism of 
the 1960’s, i.e. the sense defined by Guy Debord in 1967 with his book The 
Society of the Spectacle. I mean the sense thought by Debord, the idea of the 
whole life of societies advertised as an accumulation of spectacles, inversions 
of life by which the truth is represented as the false (DEBORD, 1971: 19). 
According to Debord: “Le spectacle dans la société correspond à une 
fabrication concrète de l’aliénation” (DEBORD, 1971: 32). 
The deviation of western societies face historical legacies has been 
increasing, since Nietzsche, showing the emerging sense of Nietzsche’s critical 
philosophy and values. Indeed, I agree with the position of Anthony Giddens, 
for instance, that it is possible a systematic knowledge of human action or the 
trends of social development (GIDDENS, 2005: 33). 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Undoubtedly there are many interpretations of Kafka’s writings. The 
search for the meanings of his longer and shorter stories (the very core of his 
work) seems endless. Thus, we must read and re-read Kafka trying to find any 
useful meaning to our own life. After reading a book, the final reflection 
always raises the question about what the moral to be drawn from its history or 
story. In the case of Kafka’s In the Penal Colony, as it happens with all 
narratives, moral interpretation is subjective and can be exaggerated. 
The machine writes a kind of trial; it includes the Law on the body of 
the condemned. Only the sacrifice of the body keeps the sanity of the Law. 
The law is always a post-facio to the body, wrote Jean-François Lyotard 
respecting Kafka’s In the Penal Colony (1992: 166). 
In the Penal Colony offers a disturbing and figurative reflection about 
the relationship between, on the one hand, men and machine and, on the other 
hand, men and Justice. Kafka’s view about these relationships is negative. So, 
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do we live better with all technologic progress around Justice and awareness of 
life? I don’t think so; we live in an inhuman way, i.e. with moral alienation and 
according to an individualistic way of live proper of the post-modern societies. 
Along this paper, I have expressed a critical point of view over the 
individualism post-modern and the associate moral alienation and unawareness 
of life. Does life in society has to be beautiful or good? Not necessarily. Life 
has to be, at least, awareness about all adversities of human condition. 
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